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INNOVATIONS DISGUISED AS 
TRADITIONS: A HISTORICAL 
REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT 
NOMINATIONS PROCESS 
Ronald D. Rotunda* 
Ronald Rotunda, the Albert Jenner Professor of Law at the 
University of Illinois, may be best known for his work in consti-
tutional law. He has published the definitive multivolume trea-
tise in that field along with his colleague John Nowak, as well 
as a casebook and a variety of articles. His stature in the field 
has been confirmed by his early election to the American Law 
Institute and his citations in the opinions of the Supreme Court. 
Professor Rotunda also teaches and writes in the field of legal 
ethics and is a leader of that generation of scholars who took up 
the field in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Perhaps most 
important for all who admire him, Professor Rotunda is himself 
a profoundly honest and ethical individual who often works be-
hind the scenes on projects-like the Rededication of the Law 
School-to improve the stature of the College of Law.** 
President Clinton's consideration of various candidates to replace 
Justices White and Blackmun consumed almost as much newsprint as 
his search for an attorney general. Given the age of some of the Jus-
tices, it would not be surprising if the President will have the opportu-
nity to fill another vacancy before the end of his four-year term. We 
expect the media to report thoroughly on his possible choices, and ru-
mors of his choices, long before he makes the actual nomination. Su-
preme Court appointments were not always such newsworthy events. 
The presidential and senatorial appointment process has changed 
much over the last two centuries, and recent innovations are often 
wrongly thought to be old traditions. 
Appointment to the Supreme Court gives the recipient a very 
prestigious job, a powerful position, indoor work, no heaving lifting. 
While some things never change (the job is still indoors with no heav-
* Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1967, 
Harvard College; J.D. !970, Harvard Law School. 
** This abstract is a reprint of Professor James E. Pfander's introductory remarks. 
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ing lifting), the position did not start off as either particularly powe 
ful or prestigious, and so people often turned it down. 1 It was 0 , 
uncommon in the early years for nominees to decline the honor, or 1 
resign to take better jobs in the state judiciary,' or for Presidents 1 
nominate a political opponent simply to get him out of the picture. 
In grade school we learned that President Adams chose Jot 
Marshall to be the young nation's fourth Chief Justice. But fewer per 
pie recall that Marshall was Adams's third or fourth choice• It w1 
not unusual in those days to decline a position on the Supreme Cou 
or to resign soon after appointment. By the time of Marshall's confi 
mation in 1801, the six-member Court had had ten individuals fill tl 
five places reserved for Associate Justice, and four people had fill< 
the one place reserved for Chief Justice.' 
Washington, for example, nominated Robert Hanson Harrison 
the first Court, but he rejected the honor in order to become ChancE 
lor of Maryland. 6 Then Washington turned to James Iredell (thirt 
l. Senator George Mitchell was reported to have withdrawn from consideration when Pn 
dent Clinton considered the vacancy created when Justice Blackmun retired. The news repo 
suggested various reasons. Senate Majority Leader Mitchell, who retired from the U.S. Senate 
1994, at the end of his term, expbined that he wanted to focus his energies on passing comprel1( 
sive health care reform. However, whatever the reasons, it is dear that Mitchell did not withdr 
from consideration on the ground that the job was not important enough. 
2. John Rutledge, for example, resigned in 1791 so that he could become Chief Justice 
the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas and Sessions. 4 RONALD D RoTUNDA & JOHN 
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE app. at 767 (2d 
1992). 
3. When Postmaster General McLean objected to President Jackson's attempt to use 
postal service for political purposes, Jackson "kicked McLean upstairs, which reveals something 
the manner in which the court was regarded even as late as Jackson's time." CoRTEZ AM E 
JNG, THE JL:oGES OF THE SUPREME COURT. 1789-1937: A STUDY OF THE!R QUALIFICATIONS 92 
n.3 (1938). 
4. 2 GEORGE L. HASKINS, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE : 
l'REME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UJ>;ITED STAl 
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, !801-15, at 7 (Paul A. Freund cd., !98!). 
Adams first appointed John Jay, who was then ending his term as Governor of New York, 
the position of Chief Justice. The Senate quickly confirmed him, but Jay refused the appointm 
anyway. Adams then considered Justice Cushing (and apparently Paterson after Cushing); b 
Cushing and Paterson were already on the Supreme Court, and Adams began to question the i+ 
of appointing from within the Court, which would require him to make another appointment to 
the vacancy that he would have created by the internal promotion. Adams then turned to M 
shall. After that, some people tried to persuade Adams to replace Marshall's nomination \1 
Paterson's, but Adams refused. The Senate, on January 27, 180\, unanimously confirmed M 
shall. !d. at 103-04. 
5. The four people who had filled the position for Chief Justice, by the time of Marshf 
confirmation, were Jay, Rutledge, Ellsworth, and Marshall. 
The ten people who had filled the five places reserved for Associate Justice, by the timet 
Marshall had been confirmed, were Blair, Cushing, Rutledge, Wilson, Johnson, Iredell, Paten 
Chase, Washington, and Moore. 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, app. at 759. 
6. Some secondary sources claim that Harrison decided to reject the appointment so 
because of his ill health. However, he did accept the state appointment, notwithstanding 
health, and when he wrote Washington on October 27, 1789, he did not rely on that exc1 
Instead, he offered these reasons: 
Should I accept the appointment, I should be constrained to take the more unfavourabl 
residence ['the seat of government,' then in New York]. The number of my family has bee 
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eight years old), who accepted but died nine short years later in 
1799.7 Our first Chief Justice, John Jay (who was only forty-four 
years old when appointed), resigned six years later to become Gover-
nor of New York. John Rutledge, whom George Washington ap-
pointed in 1789, never actually sat with the Court and resigned in 
1791. Washington made him the young nation's second Chief Justice 
in 1795, but he left the recess appointment later that year when the 
Senate rejected him. The following year, after one of his choices de-
clined to serve, Washington appointed Senator Oliver Ellsworth as 
Chief Justice. In 1799, Ellsworth became ambassador to France, and 
the following year he also resigned from the Court. 8 
Nowadays, the health of a nominee would be considered quite 
relevant, but that was not always so. When President Washington 
chose candidates to the U.S. Supreme Court, he did not bother to 
make any inquiries into health. We now know that many of his 
choices were of poor health, yet they accepted. Jay, for example, had 
rheumatism; Blair complained of an inner ear problem that was so 
distracting that it eventually caused him to resign; Cushing developed 
a growth on his lip; Chase and Ellsworth both had the gout and renal 
stones• It would be unheard of for a present-day candidate to refuse 
to share relevant medical data with the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
but Washington never even asked his nominees about their health. 
Geographic diversity also used to be very important in the selec-
tion process. When President Madison sought a replacement for Jus-
tice Cushing of Massachusetts, he turned to Joseph Story only after 
Levi Lincoln-and then John Quincy Adams-declined the invita-
encreased [sic] by the unfortunate event of a Brother's death, and I consider myself under an 
indispensable necessity of attending to the affairs of his Children, as their friend and Guard~ 
ian~·both for their interest and for my own indemnity. These considerations, Sir, and one 
more, of still greater weight,-a distrust of my competency to the arduous & exalted Sta* 
tion ........... and the persuasion that my not accepting, will not be a matter of public detriment, 
induce me to determine that I cannot but decline the appointment. 
Letter from Robert H. Harrison to George Washington (OcL 27, 1789), reprinted in I DocuMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE Ul\'ITED STATES, 1779~1800, pt. I, at 38 (Maeva 
Marcus et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter DocuMENTARY HISTORY]. 
During his life, Harrison declined a lot of appointments, even when in good health. In 1785, 
long before his death, he declined a congressional appointment to decide a land dispute. In 1787, 
he even refused to be one of Maryland's delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. !d. at 
33. On health issues, see infra text accompanying note 9. 
7. Iredell stopped attending Court sessions starting with the August 1799 Term of the 
Court. See H.G. Connor, James Iredell: Lawyer, Statesman, Judge, 60 U PENN. L REV. 225, 252 
(1912). But Iredell did not die until some months later, apparently on October 10, 1799. Surpris-
ingly, no formal notification exists of the death of James Iredell. See DocuMENTARY HtsTORY, 
supra note 6, at 68. 
8. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § l.2(a)-(b). 
9. 1 JULiUS GOEBEL JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT Of THE UNITED STATES 
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER ANTECEDENTS AND BEGrNNINGS TO 1801, at 553 & n.8 (Paul A. 
Freund ed., 1971). 
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tion. 10 All three individuals were residents of Massachusetts. That was 
no accident, because Madison insisted that the nominee be from a 
New England state. It is only quite recently that Presidents have, with 
regularity, ignored the custom of geographic diversity11 
Until modern times, it was unusual for two Justices to come from 
the same state,12 but the news media paid little attention to that fact 
in 1981, when President Reagan appointed Justice O'Connor even 
though both she and Justice Rehnquist were residents of Arizona. 
When President Clinton replaced Justice White, he considered, but 
ultimately did not appoint, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Bab-
bitt-even though he, like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O'Connor, hails from Arizona. Bruce Babbitt's name was again men-
tioned as being on the short list of candidates who might replace Jus-
tice Blackmun. Although the President did not choose him, the fact 
that he would have been the third Justice from the same state did not 
appear to have been a stumbling block. 13 Nowadays, the simple fact is 
that geographic diversity and state residency are less important to 
people than other types of diversity, mainly race and sex, and perhaps 
religion. (For many years, commentators referred to a "Jewish seat" 
on the Court.) 
As the Court has become more powerful, the nature of the confir-
mation hearing has also changed. To say that the earlier hearings 
were not as elaborate and public as today is, to say the least, an un-
derstatement. For example, on September 4, 1922, Justice John Hes-
sin Clarke resigned from the Supreme Court. The next day President 
Harding nominated his successor, George Sutherland, and the Senate 
confirmed the lifetime appointment later that very same day." In 
fact, for over a third of a century, from 1894 until 1930, the Senate 
never rejected a nominee, although there were some bitter confirma-
10. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Joseph Story: A Man for All Seasons, in !990 
JOURNAL OF SCPREME COURT HISTORY. YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCI-
ETY 17 (1990). 
11. E.g., GOEBEL, supra note 9, at 553 (pointing out that "proper geographic distribution of 
the posts" on the Supreme Court started with President Washington). 
12. A rare exception was Hoover's third appointmcnt-Cardozo from New York-although 
Justice Stone and Chief Justice Hughes were also from New York. Cardozo replaced Holmes of 
Massachusetts. The circumstances were unusuaL Hoover, in 1932, was politically very weak, and 
Cardozo was very popular, someone who could get readily confirmed. The Senate approved him 
unanimously. See Ira H. Carmen, The President, Politics and the Power of Appointment: Hoo-
ver's Nomination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 55 VA. L REV. 616 (l969). 
Cardozo's nomination was "a violation of the long standing tradition that the membership of 
the Court represent as wide a geographic base as possible." !d. at 6!6. It was important that 
Senator Borah of Idaho supported Cardozo, even though Hoover was thinking of naming a west-
erner to the Court. 
13. The President nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Judge Stephen G. Breyer of the 
First Circuit, a resident of Massachusetts. 
14. 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § 2.7, at 109. 
No. l] SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS 127 
tion f1ghts.'" A modern president never would assume that Senate 
confirmation is assured. Yet, until quite recently, the Senate confirma-
tion process was usually brief. For example, in 1969, the Democratic-
dominated Senate confirmed Warren Burger only nineteen days after 
President Nixon had nominated him." 
Until 1929, the Senate had a rule that all nominations would be 
considered in executive session unless two-thirds of the senators voted 
otherwise. Over the years, as the media began to look at nominees 
more actively, the Senate began to reconsider its policy of conducting 
confirmation hearings and debates on the Senate floor in private. In 
1929, the Senate changed its policy so that now the default rule is 
public debate unless a majority votes otherwise. 17 Before that, this 
century saw open debate only in the very public and extended debate 
over Justice Brandeis (in which the opposition laced its rejection of his 
social activism with extensive anti-Semitic rhetoric) 18 and in the con-
troversy over the nomination of Justice Stone. 
The Stone controversy is interesting because it marked the first 
time in history that a Supreme Court nominee ever personally ap-
peared before the Senate Committee considering the confirmation of 
the nominee. Until that time, the nominee might send telegrams or 
other written communications to the Committee in order to respond to 
issues, but the nominee himself would not appear. Even Justice Bran-
deis did not appear personally to respond to ethics and other charges 
(though he did have an informal dinner meeting with two senators 
who had doubts about his nomination).'" Until the Stone nomination, 
if a candidate did ask to appear in person, the Committee would sim-
ply deny the request. 20 
The Stone appointment changed all that. The circumstances were 
unusual. Coolidge nominated Stone on January 25, 1925, and the 
Senate Judiciary Committee approved him unanimously. As was the 
custom, Stone did not appear before the Committee. Then, Senator 
15. The confirmation battle over Justice Brandeis, see infra note 18 and accompanying text, 
had the characteristics of a major political campaign. See Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Jus~ 
tices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV L. REV. 1146, 1151 (1988). Professor Freund told 
me some years ago that when the media spends a lot less attention on Supreme Court nominees, 
that will be a sign that civilization has progressed. 
16. Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 
101 HARV L REV 1213, 1214 (1988). 
17. Freund, supra note 15, at 1157. 
18. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, 9 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COCRT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERN-
MENT. 1910-21, at 357-92 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1984); John P. Frank, The 
Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN_ L REV. 683 (1965). 
19. ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 503-04 (1946). 
20. See John P. Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices: Prestige, Principles, 
and Politics, 1941 WIS. L. REV. 172, 200-10. 
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Burton K. Wheeler of Montana objected strenuously and persuaded 
the Senate to recommit the nomination to the Committee. 
Wheeler claimed that Stone, while Attorney General, should 
have dismissed an allegedly improper indictment that Stone's prede-
cessor had brought against Wheeler. Stone asked to be heard in per-
son to defend his action, and the Committee accepted. Stone limited 
his responses to this one issue, the Committee once again approved 
him, and the Senate then confirmed him, with both Montana Senators 
abstaining'' 
After the Stone nomination, the Senate went back to the tradi-
tion of not calling the nominees to testify. Hoover's nominee, Judge 
Parker of the Fourth Circuit, asked the Senate Committee to allow 
him to respond in person to charges that he was antilabor and racist, 
but the Senate denied that request, only allowed written responses,22 
rejected him, and then confirmed Hoover's second choice, Owen 
Roberts. 
The hearing process began to change more dramatically during 
the New Deal. When Roosevelt nominated Senator Hugo Black in 
1937, the Senate, for the first time in a half century, decided to hold 
hearings on a senator. Before that, if the nominee was a senator, the 
Senate tradition had been to hold no hearings and confirm immedi-
ately. Still, Hugo Black, as was the custom, never appeared before the 
Committee. 
That custom finally changed with Felix Frankfurter's nomination 
in 1939. Frankfurter's opponents claimed that Frankfurter was too 
radical, was too chummy with F.D.R., was Jewish, and that the next 
nominee should be someone west of the Mississippi. This time the 
Senate Committee invited Frankfurter to attend. At first he refused 
(claiming that the press of his law teaching prevented him!), but he 
relented after witnesses attacked him, his associations, his foreign 
birth, and his religion. Accompanied by his lawyer, Dean Acheson, 
Frankfurter read a prepared statement, which explained that he 
would not express his personal views on controversial issues before the 
Court. He responded to a question from Senator McCarran regarding 
his patriotism by reaffirming his belief in "Americanism." The entire 
episode lasted only about ninety minutes." 
21. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT· 
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 193-94 (2d ed. 1985). 
22. WILLIAM C. BURRIS, DUTY AND THE LAW: JUDGE JOH!\ J_ PARKER Al'D THE CoNSTITU-
TION 84-85 (1987). 
23. See Nomination of Felix Frankfurter to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., Jst Sess. 
(1939) (response of felix frankfurter); see a/so L!VA BAKER, fELIX fRANKFURTER 208-10 
(1969). 
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After Frankfurter's appearance, all other nominees, except for 
Sherman Minton, followed suit. When Minton, whom Truman nomi-
nated in 1949, refused to appear before the Committee, some Sena-
tors criticized his refusal. There was an attempt to recommit his nom-
ination to the Committee, but it failed, forty-five to twenty-one. 24 
Nowadays, it would be unheard of for the nominee to refuse to appear 
and to be questioned in person. 
To bolster their position with the Senate, Presidents began, in 
1948, a new tradition: seeking the advice of the American Bar Associ-
ation on Supreme Court appointments. Four years after that, Presi-
dent Eisenhower began the regular practice of sending nearly every 
federal judicial appointment to the ABA's Standing .Committee on the 
Federal Judiciary. That Committee-again, until recently-normally 
approved the nominees. In 1970, for example, the ABA approved G. 
Harrold Carswell of the Fifth Circuit, who was widely accused not 
only of mediocrity but also of racism." The Senate rejected Carswell, 
although Lawrence Walsh, then the Chair of the ABA Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary (and later, the Independent Pros-
ecutor in the Iran-Contra affair) defended the ABA's 
recommendation. 26 
More recently some commentators have accused the ABA of 
politicizing the process in a way that is unfavorable to politically in-
correct nominees, but the present chair of the ABA Standing Com-
mittee expects that friction will continue even under a Democratic 
president.27 Under President Clinton, the ABA Standing Committee 
has continued its role of evaluating judicial appointments. In fact, be-
cause of the increased number of appointments, the Board of Gover-
nors, at the ABA midyear meeting in February 1994, increased the 
Standing Committee's budget twenty-five percent, to $250,000. 28 
An even more recent innovation in the confirmation process is the 
nominee's private "courtesy call." Only since the 1970s has it been 
the norm for Supreme Court nominees to pay courtesy calls on se-
lected Senators, moving from office to office. Because the meetings are 
24. Freund, supra note 15, at 1161. 
25. In 1948, Carswell gave a speech advocating racism. In 1956, he was one of the incorpo· 
raton; who converted a public golf course into a private one so that it could remain racially segre-
gated. At his confirmation hearings, he denied that he had ::.een these incorporation documents 
since 1956. Later, press reports revealed that he had seen the documents on the eve of his confir-
mation hearings and that the ABA Judicial Selection Committee had asked him questions about 
them. RICHARD HARRIS, DECISION 18-43 ( 1971 ); Totenberg, supra note 16, at 1217. 
26. Lawrence E. Walsh, Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 56 A.B.A. J. 555-60 (1970). 
27. See The ABA Role in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearings Before rhe Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Clinton Camp's Bid to Fill Judgeships 
Has ABA Expanding Its Resources, CHAMPA!GN~URBANA NEWS GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 1994, at A7 
(quoting Robert P. Watkins, Chairman, ABA Standing Committee). 
28. Clinton Camp's Bid to Fill Judgeships Has ABA Expanding Its Resources, CHAM-
PAIGN-URBANA NEWS GAZETTE, feb. 7, !994, at A7. 
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held in private, there is no record of what is said, or promised, or 
alleged to have been said or promised?• A candidate who nowadays 
refused to engage in such private meetings would put the nomination 
at risk, although the private nature of such meetings eliminates the 
important check of public scrutiny. 
Amazingly, even the practice of allowing radio microphones or 
television cameras is a recent innovation. It was not until 1981, with 
the confirmation of the first woman on the Court, that the Senate 
finally allowed radio and television to record the event. Before that, 
the public could read about the nominee but could never hear her 
words or see her testimony 30 
Over the years, one of the few constants in the nomination pro-
cess has been the fact that the President does not formally consult 
with the Senate, as a body, prior to his announcement, even though 
the Constitution states that the President "shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges 
of the supreme Court .... " 31 That same clause of the Constitution 
also provides that the President shall make treaties "by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . . " 32 Just as Presidents have 
not consulted with the Senate prior to making treaties, they have not 
followed the practice of consulting with the Senate prior to announc-
ing their Supreme Court nominees. President Washington did consult 
with the Senate (which was a much smaller body at the time) while 
he was in the process of negotiating an Indian Treaty, but he found 
the experience so frustrating that he vowed never to do it again, a 
promise that he and subsequent Presidents have kept. 33 
Over the last two centuries, there have been important changes in 
the selection process, the questions asked of nominees, the role of geo-
graphic diversity, the type of hearing that the Senate Committee con-
ducts, and the media's coverage of the hearing. What was aberra-
tional is now commonplace. 
For good or ill, the trend in modern times is for the Senate and 
the media to become more involved in the nomination process. 34 One 
29. See Car! Marcy, Nominees Shouldn't Pay Courtesy Calls on Senators, N.Y. TIMES. 
JULY 29. 1981, at 23; see also Judge O'Connor Talks with Potential Critics, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
1981, at 24; Mrs. O'Connor Makes the Scene, N.Y TIMES, July 19, 1981, § IV, at 4. 
30. Totenberg, supra note 16, at 1213 & n.l (referring to telephone interview with a mem-
ber of the Senate Judiciary staff). 
31. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
32. !d. 
33. EOWARD S. CORWI:-.1, THE PRESIDENT· OFFICE AND POWERS: 1787-1984, at 238-40 
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984); l RoTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 
487-88. 
34. At least one respected commentator has recently urged the Senate to take an even more 
active role and add "more politics-especially more racial politics··--to the judicial selection pro-
cess .... " W. William Hodes, The Overtly "Political" Character of the Advise and Consent 
Function: Offsetting the Presidential Veto with Senatorial Rejection, 7 Sr. JOHN's J. LEGAL COM-
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cannot explain this tendency by assuming that the Senate's increased 
role is a function of the fact that the Republicans have often con-
trolled the presidency in recent years while the Democrats have usu-
ally controlled the Senate. The change in the nature of the confirma-
tion process began during F.D.R.'s presidency and has continued 
unabated under both Republican and Democratic presidents. 
The increased public scrutiny may encourage the nomination of 
relative unknowns to the Court because there is less of a paper trail 
that might draw questions. Although weak Presidents have always 
found it politic to nominate compromise or unknown candidates, the 
creation of a confirmation hearing as a media event may encourage 
such action. In addition, some first-class nominees may refuse to be 
considered because they do not wish to endure the gauntlet of being 
subjected to unfair flyspecking of one's career. And a president, par-
ticularly a weak one, may refuse to nominate some candidates because 
that president does not wish to take a risk with those who may be the 
object of various rumors of long past events. That the rumors may 
prove to be false is relevant but not conclusive. 
However the process for approving nominees changes, we should 
realize that the Senate does not choose a new Justice for today, to-
morrow, or even for next year. For example, Souter, when Bush chose 
him, was the same age (fifty) as Brennan was when Eisenhower se-
lected him." If Souter's tenure on the Court is as long as Brennan's, 
he will be deciding cases in 2024. Although Holmes was sixty-one 
years old when Theodore Roosevelt appointed him to the Court in 
1902, he sat for thirty years. 
To the extent that the confirmation process tries to determine 
how the nominee will vote in particular cases, it is focusing on an 
issue that cannot really be answered. We do not know what the major 
legal questions will be ten years from now, much less thirty years. 
Nor do we know what the liberal or conservative answers to those 
questions will be. However, if the more active confirmation process 
focuses on the nominee's integrity, intellectual ability, and good judg-
ment, it may produce better Justices. A more public confirmation pro-
cess does not preclude that focus. 
MENT 109, 123 (1991). Contra, e.g., Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 
HARV L. REV. 672 (1989). 
35. President Bush appointed Souter in July of !990. Maureen Dowd, Souter, New Hamp-
shire Judge; Named by Bush for High Court; No 'Litmus Test,' President Says, N.Y TIMES, July 
24, 1990, at AI. Souter turned 51 in September of 1990, and joined the Court in October of that 
year. 
